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Abstract
This thesis assesses philosophical arguments in favour of patent systems. These 
come in both consequentialist and deontological forms, the latter of which are 
the focus of this analysis. One kind of deontological argument is based on the 
concept of desert. I argue that on any plausible conception of desert, the patent 
system fails to distribute rewards as well as viable alternative systems could. 
The other kind of deontological argument claims that inventors are entitled to 
patent rights over their inventions as an extension of their natural rights, 
drawing on a Lockean account of the conditions of legitimate appropriation of 
unowned goods. After a discussion of the metaphysics of invention, and of the 
nature of the commons, I argue that Locke's conditions are not in fact always 
trivially satisfied in the case of patents. Furthermore, entitlement-based 
arguments conclude that because new inventions are unowned, claiming 
property rights in them involves only the same moral considerations that would 
apply in the state of nature. I argue that because we are not in the state of nature, 
pre-existing property rights also need to be taken into account, which conflict 
with patents. The broad conclusion of this thesis is that none of the plausible 
deontological arguments for patent systems are sound. The implication is that 
any justification of must therefore be made in consequentialist terms; this 
ultimately rests on strong empirical evidence rather than normative arguments 
alone.
11. Introduction
Patents are a kind of intellectual property right relating to inventions. They grant their owners the 
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or distributing versions of the patented 
invention. Because of this exclusivity, they potentially prevent worthwhile ends being pursued or 
important needs being fulfilled. For instance, if there is a patent on a life-saving drug, those who 
cannot afford to pay the license fee may die unnecessarily
1. Research on genes can be stifled by 
patents
2. If patents are to be justified, strong reasons will need to be found for granting such 
exclusivity rights. 
There has been a long history of opposition to intellectual property,
3 and the question of its 
justification is now hotly debated by legal scholars, economists, politicians and activists.
4 It has also 
gained attention from philosophers. Much of the philosophical work focuses on intellectual property 
in general, or on copyright in particular, drawing on political philosophy and ethics, as well as on 
the metaphysics of the objects of intellectual property. But intellectual property should also be of 
interest in the context of science and technology in society, especially where patents are concerned. 
Much of the subject matter of patents is developed not by amateur inventors but by scientists. It is 
researchers in biology, chemistry, engineering and other disciplines, whether employed by 
universities or the private sector, who create many of the patented inventions of today. Aside from 
discovering fundamental truths about the world, a primary purpose of such research is to pave the 
way for new technologies, which solve problems and create new opportunities.
5 If we care about 
science as an institution for generating this kind of 'practical knowledge', then anything which 
restricts the use of that knowledge deserves scrutiny. Patents strongly determine the conditions 
under which the practical applications of research can be put to use, both within science and wider 
society. As barriers to accessing the output of research, patents ought to be an important concern for 
those interested in ethical and political dimensions of science and technology. Are they consistent 
with the universal right, as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights says, “to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits?
6
In making the case for intellectual property reform, some authors reference an older tradition within 
the scientific community, according to which the output of science should be openly available to 
all.
7 Sociologists of science working in the middle of the last century, such as Merton (1942), 
Barber (1953), and Hagstrom (1965), each provided similar characterisations of the norms of 
scientific research. One such norm was the promotion of a public domain of freely available 
scientific information. Merton (1942) is known for characterising science as 'communistic', in the 
sense that the findings of science are a product of social collaboration and thus owned jointly by the 
community. Hagstrom claimed that “scientific knowledge is [seen as] community property” (1965, 
p99). According to Barber, property rights in scientific inventions are often seen as immoral (1953, 
p153-54). In the scientific community of the 21
st century, these norms may have lost some of their 
1 Mercurio (2004)
2 Williams (2010)
3 Benjamin Franklin held that “as we enjoy great advantages from the inventions of others, we should be glad of an 
opportunity to serve others by any invention of ours; and this we should do freely and generously.” Franklin (1916)
4  Prominent legal scholars include Lessig (2004) and Boyle (2008). Activists include those united under the 'Access to 
Knowledge' banner (Krikorian and Kapczynski [2010]), Sweden's 'Pirate Party' (Li [2009]), and the free software 
movement (Stallman [2011]), amongst others.
5  Intellectual property can also restrict access to the propositional knowledge generated in fundamental research, 
because particular expressions of such knowledge are covered by copyright; the 'open access' movement proposes an 
alternative (see Kaiwen [2005] for an overview)
6  Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (retrieved 2011).
7  See Boyle (2008), chapter 7, Lessig (2004) chapter 11 note 76.
2weight, but they still hold to some extent.
8 And as an increasing number of the practical applications 
of science end up covered by patents, perhaps it is now time to reconsider the case for this practice.
In the rest of this section, I will outline some of the pertinent facts about patents. I will also outline a 
difference between intellectual property and other kinds of property, namely that the former relates 
to types while the latter relates to tokens. This has important implications for the justificatory 
arguments in favour of patents considered later. Section 2 describes the terms in which a 
justification of patents can be made, and differentiates consequentialist and deontological 
approaches, the latter of which will be the main concern of this paper. In section 3 I develop and 
critique one kind of deontological argument, which is based on the concept of desert, drawing from 
previously unconnected literature on desert. I argue that on any plausible conception of desert, the 
patent system fails to distribute rewards to deserving labourers as well as alternative systems would.
Section 4 will consider what I call entitlement-based arguments, which argue that inventors are 
entitled to patent rights over their inventions as an extension of their natural rights. They draw on a 
Lockean account of the conditions of legitimate appropriation of unowned goods. Defenders of 
entitlement-based accounts argue that intellectual property can always trivially satisfy Locke's 
conditions. After a discussion of the metaphysics of invention, and of the nature of the commons, I 
will argue that Locke's conditions are not in fact always trivially satisfied in the case of patents. 
Furthermore, entitlement-based arguments falsely conclude that because new inventions are 
unowned, claiming property rights in them involves only the same moral considerations that would 
apply in the state of nature. But, I argue, because we are not in the state of nature, we must also 
consider pre-existing property rights, which conflict with patents. This ultimately undermines an 
entitlement-based justification of patents.
If neither of the plausible deontological arguments are sound, this leaves only the consequentialist 
approach. Ultimately, the justification of patent systems may therefore be reliant on empirical and 
economic analyses which fall outside the purview of philosophy.
1.1 Introduction to patents
The following are real examples of patented inventions:
a) “Synthetic Biology Vectors”
The invention provides compositions, methods and kits for generating synthetic genetic circuits in 
biological systems.
Inventors: Woolf et al
b) "Vegetable and fruit nutrients-enriched rice"
Separately prepared fruit and vegetable juices are used to cook rice without additional water, so that 
the rice grains absorb and adsorb the nutrients.
Inventor: Tse Wen Chang
c) “Anti-AIDS drug”
An agent which comprises, as the active ingredients, one or more components selected from the 
group consisting of [Melastoma, … stevia].
Inventor: Michio Tani
d) "Apple tree named Silken"
8  See Rai (1999)
3A new and distinct variety of apple tree, originating from a controlled cross of `Honeygold` and 
`Sunrise'.
Inventor: W. David Lane
Assignee: Okanagan Plant Improvement Co. Ltd.
As well as showing the broad range of things that can be patented, these examples illustrate how 
patents can restrict access to the fruits of research, and potentially conflict with the Mertonian 
norms. A) is a patent on compositions, methods and kits for the emerging field of synthetic biology, 
which attempts to engineer biological systems from scratch – in this case, to make the biological 
equivalents of electrical components. The development of this new science will be strongly 
determined by the existence of these patents, because researchers working in this area cannot use 
these compositions, methods or kits to practice their science without the owner's permission. In 
contrast (and perhaps in opposition) to this approach, some researchers in this area have not pursued 
patent protection. In a move consistent with Merton's 'communism', MIT's research into synthetic 
biology has been made freely available to all (Arkin 2008). As well as affecting research, these 
examples also illustrate how patents affect access to inventions that could be directly important to 
wider society. B) and c) clearly both have the potential to alleviate health problems, by aiding 
nutrition and preventing disease. Finally, patents on plants such as d) place restrictions on what 
future plant breeders are allowed to do, which could affect research in plant sciences, as well as the 
agricultural industry, and the freedoms of farmers more generally. These examples illustrate some of 
the potentially negative effects of patents. MIT's decision illustrates that there is an alternative way 
of doing things. Good reasons in favour of patents rather than alternatives will therefore be needed 
to outweigh these potential negative effects.
The examples also show that the potential subject matter of patents is broad. The US patent system 
recognises three types of patent
9. Utility patents are the most common, and cover “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof”. Examples a)-c) above are utility patents, covering compositions of matter 
and methods. In addition there are design patents, which protect a particular ornamental design, and 
plant patents, which protect any new asexually reproduced plant (as in example d) above). 
Patents should be distinguished from copyrights, which cover new expressive works such as 
literature, songs, or artworks, and last for anything up to 70 years after the author's death. I do not 
consider copyrights in what follows because the issues they raise may be different to patents. As 
copyrights cover creative works rather than inventions per se, they do not relate in the same way to 
the concerns raised above about access to the fruits of scientific research.
Upon creating a new invention, an inventor can apply to national patent offices (in multiple 
jurisdictions, if they can afford it) for protection. In the U.S., there are three main criteria for utility 
patents: novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness. The novelty condition requires that the applicant 
is the first person to conceive and publicly disclose the invention. For example, had somebody 
already thought of using nutrient-rich vegetable juice to enrich rice, and publicly disclosed this idea, 
b) could not have been granted
10. The usefulness condition requires that the invention serve some 
practical purpose, such as the detection of breast cancer, or enhancing the nutritional value of a 
meal. Finally, the invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the relevant area of expertise. 
If the anti-AIDS drug were an obvious cure, which anyone knowledgeable about the disease and the 
properties of the ingredients might turn to, then it wouldn't have been eligible for patent protection.
9 In what follows I focus on the US system for simplicity.
10 On the other hand, if they had merely thought of the patented idea, but not disclosed it, this would not invalidate the 
patent – they would have to prove that they had also already disclosed the idea.
4A further, more contentious criterion, embodied in legal doctrine, is that patents can only be granted 
over genuine inventions rather than mere 'discoveries'.
11 This distinction, which raises interesting 
metaphysical questions, has been the subject of much dispute. It has been proposed that discoveries 
are things which already exist in nature, whereas inventions would not exist were it not for their 
inventor's efforts. For instance, some claim that one shouldn't be able to patent the human genome, 
because this already exists in nature, but one should be allowed to patent, for instance, an invented 
method for isolating a gene.
12 The possibility of a precise characterisation of the distinction is not 
my direct concern here, suffice to say that it is widely held that however exactly they differ from 
inventions, discoveries are not patentable.
13
Successful patent applicants get the legally enforceable right to exclude others from making, 
possessing, using, and selling copies of the invention for twenty years. This even includes the right 
to exclude someone from using their own version of the invention if they subsequently 
independently invent it themselves.
14 For example, Okanagan Plant Improvement Co, the owners of 
the Silken apple tree patent, have the right to stop others from making, using or selling copies of the 
Silken tree. Anybody who crosses the Honeygold and Sunrise apple trees in such a way as to result 
in a Silken tree is infringing on Okanagan's patent. This is so even if they own their own Honeygold 
and Sunrise trees, and even if they are unaware of the prior existence of the patented Silken tree.
1.2 Intellectual goods and the type / token distinction
In this subsection I identify some important differences between intellectual and non-intellectual 
goods. These differences are the source of some of the asymmetries in the justifications of 
intellectual and non-intellectual property encountered in sections 3 and 4.
Paradigmatic examples of property include land, houses, and clothes. Intellectual property, on the 
other hand, covers ideas such as designs, techniques, or methods. For example, b) relates to an 
intangible idea; a general technique for creating a nutritious meal, rather than a particular instance 
of the use of that technique. A) relates not to concrete particular instances of biological matter, but 
rather to the idea of combining biological matter in a certain way. One might therefore think that the 
tangible / intangible distinction is what makes intellectual goods different from other kinds of 
goods. But whilst the intangibility of intellectual goods may make them metaphysically interesting, 
it is not what makes them problematic in the arguments I will explore in the following sections. 
Whilst it is true that all intellectual goods are intangible, there are also some goods, such as shares, 
which are intangible but not considered intellectual property. Ownership of a share is an example of 
a property right in an intangible, but non-intellectual good. As such, it cannot simply be the 
intangibility of intellectual property that makes it different from all other types of property.
Instead, what makes intellectual property different is that it always relates to types, while non-
intellectual property, whether in physical goods (such as land and houses) or intangible goods (such 
11 See Foster and Shook (1989), and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980), which granted a patent over a life-
form on the grounds that it was the result of human ingenuity rather than a mere discovery.
12 See Resnik (2002)
13 However, I return to this issue in 35 below.
14 This is one way in which patents differ from copyrights, where there is no rule against independent creation. 
However, such independent creation of copyrightable works is highly unlikely if not impossible, as is illustrated by 
Borges (1962) in which a fictional character attempts to write Don Quixote from scratch, word-for-word, without 
having read the original text.
5as shares), always relates to tokens. 
15 
16 The object owned by Okanagan is the type 'Silken' tree.
17 If 
they sell me a particular Silken tree, I only own a token. Even if I buy every single Silken tree, I 
only own tokens of the type, not the type itself. Okanagan still have the right to exclude myself and 
others from making, using, selling or distributing new copies of the type Silken tree. Intellectual 
property is different to both token property and shares, in that it covers types rather than tokens. For 
this reason, I shall introduce the term token property to denote any property which is not intellectual 
property.
An important difference between type goods and token goods is that the former tend to be what 
economists call non-rival while the latter tend to be rival.
18 A rival good cannot be used by one 
without diminishing the ability of another to use it. My consumption of some rice and vegetables 
prevents you from consuming the same rice and vegetables. My use of an idea, a design or 
technique, on the other hand, does not diminish your ability to use that same idea (so long as in 
implementing the idea I do not use up the only resources available to implement that idea). Such 
intellectual goods are 'non-rival'. For example, my use of the technique described in the second 
example above, using my vegetables to cook nutrient-enriched rice, in no way limits your ability to 
do the same with your vegetables and rice.
This difference is not absolute, however. Some non-intellectual goods are non-rival. Traditional 
public goods, such as clean air, are non-rival, but they are certainly not intellectual goods.
19 
However, most goods that are traditionally the objects of property rights, such as land, houses and 
clothes, are rival. Similar qualifications apply to intellectual goods, which are rival in certain ways. 
We might call them non-rival in consumption; your ability to consume an intellectual  good is not 
affected by my consuming the same intellectual good.
20 However, your ability to use the good in 
other ways may be affected by my use of it. Your ability to profit from the rice nutrient enrichment 
technique by using it to create a dish to sell to me, is affected by whether or not I already use the 
technique myself. More generally, the ability to profit from an intellectual good is compromised if 
others are able to consume it for free. However, with these qualifications in mind, two 
generalisations can be made. Intellectual goods tend to be non-rival, at least in consumption. In 
contrast, the kind of non-intellectual goods that are typically the objects of property rights – houses, 
land, vegetables – are rival.
This distinction and its consequences will turn out to be important in sections 3 and 4. The fact that 
intellectual goods are types and not tokens is a key difference between them which means that while 
the desert-based justifications of property rights discussed in section 3 may succeed in the case of 
non-intellectual goods, they do succeed in the case of intellectual goods. Similarly, the fact that 
intellectual goods are non-rival in consumption forms the basis of the entitlement-based defence of 
patents which will be discussed and contested in section 4.
15 I follow Wilson (2009) in using the type-token distinction to distinguish intellectual from non-intellectual property.
16 The only apparent counter-example I can think of is that of the Queen of England's ownership of swans. She owns 
all and any swans which reside in the United Kingdom. She does not have a patent on swans, but she does seem to 
have the same kind of right over tokens of the type 'swan' that Okanagan has over tokens of the type 'Silken tree'. In 
this case it may make sense to think of the Queen's right as a special kind of intellectual property right similar to a 
patent right.
17 One might characterise this relation not as ownership of the type, but rather as a right over any new tokens of that 
type. I assume that nothing I argue for here turns on exactly how this relation is characterised.
18 See, for instance, Varian (1990) entries on Rivalry and Public Goods.
19 Although see Stiglitz (1999) for an argument for conceiving of knowledge as a global public good
20 However, even this is false for certain intellectual goods. For instance, stock market tips are rival in consumption; 
your ability to use them to stay ahead of the market is diminished by other people using them in the same way.
62. Justification
I turn now to the main concern of this dissertation; to what extent is the patent system justified? 
First, I'll clarify the terms in which a justification of the patent system would have to be made. 
Given that patents are a state-enforced monopoly, any argument for them necessarily involves 
making a political claim about what the state ought to do. Some arguments begin in political terms. 
For instance, the state has a duty to do whatever promotes national happiness; because they 
stimulate innovation and this makes people happy, the state ought to grant patents. Other arguments 
(including those discussed in sections 3 and 4 below) start by making moral claims. For instance, 
they may argue that inventors have certain rights over their inventions. This would then ground the 
political claim that the state ought to grant patent protection in order to uphold those rights. Either 
way, the conclusion must be framed in political terms.
It is not my concern here to defend an alternative to the patent system, but rather to assess a 
particular line of justification for it. But it will nevertheless be helpful to frame the justificatory 
question by presenting what the alternatives might be. One alternative is simply to withdraw patent 
protections, without replacing them with any new sources or forms of funding, incentives or 
rewards for invention. Under such a system, everyone would be legally free to use whatever ideas 
they could access. Inventors would reap whatever profits they could. The ability to protect the 
disclosure of one's idea, put it into practice better than others, and to be a first mover, would each be 
of greater importance. However, the supply of good ideas may be diminished as compared to a 
patent system.
21 Alternatively, other forms of funding or reward could be put in place of patents. 
State support for intellectual labour, such as funding research at universities, could be expanded to 
make up for the lack of private funding. Prizes or rewards could be sponsored by the state, the 
private sector, or charitable donations. As an example of this, inspired by Pogge (2002), U.S. 
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) has recently proposed the use of prizes to reward medical research 
and development, and elimination of all drug monopolies.
22 These would be alternative ways to 
incentivise or reward innovation that would not involve patents. It is worth noting that these 
alternatives to the patent system – government salaries, prizes and rewards – would not involve 
radical experiments. They are each already in place to varying degrees, and would only need  
expanding to make up for any shortfall in innovation from the removal of patents.
2.1 Consequentialist Justifications
Justifications of patents can be broadly categorised into two kinds; what I will call 'consequentialist' 
and 'deontological'. The consequentialist approach claims that patent protection is the best way to 
achieve some desirable outcome. A popular defence takes the maximisation of innovation as the 
relevant end. This version is assumed in the economic literature and reflected in the wording of 
United States law on intellectual property:
"to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
23
The classic argument asks us to imagine a situation in which someone has a good idea which gives 
them some competitive advantage in a marketplace. Revealing the idea to others means losing that 
advantage. In order to encourage the inventor to disclose his secret so others can benefit, the state 
21 Although the empirical evidence for this assumption is not conclusive; see Moore (1998)
22 S.1137 - Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act (2011)
23 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution
7grants him a monopoly on the use of the idea. That way, the inventor gains a profit from licensing 
his invention, others benefit from using the idea (for a price), and everyone is better off than they 
would be had the invention been kept secret. As well as encouraging disclosure, such a mechanism 
also provides incentives and support for research of new ideas by enabling inventors to recoup their 
costs and gain a profit.
This is the most common version of the consequentialist argument, made in economic terms. Of 
course, most people don't think innovation itself is worth maximising, but rather that innovation 
promotes some other goal which is worth pursuing, such as utility or social welfare. I here intend 
the term consequentialist to cover a broad range of arguments, namely, any view which takes a 
'forward-looking' approach, justifying patents as the best means to a valuable end. For example, a 
view according to which patents are justified because they lead to a flourishing society (Fisher 
2001) would count as consequentialist.
2.2. Deontological Justifications
In contrast, there is what I will call the 'deontological' approach. Rather than framing a justification 
of patents in terms of what would be the best way to achieve some valuable end for society, this 
approach focuses on individual owners of intellectual property. According to this view, inventors 
have certain morally important interests which ought to be respected, and patents are the best way 
to serve those interests. For instance, it may be claimed that we all have certain natural rights (moral 
rights which are independent of legal rights) including the right to own the products we create with 
our bodies and minds. Or that by exerting mental or physical labour, we thereby come to deserve  
the fruits of that labour. In order to protect the natural rights of labourers, or to give them what they 
deserve, the state must grant patent rights. This approach can be contrasted with the consequentialist 
approach in that it is non-instrumental – it doesn't justify patent ownership as a means to some 
valuable social end, but rather as an end in itself.
As I have already hinted at in mentioning both the concept of rights and of desert, a further 
distinction within the deontological approach can be made. There are two possible kinds of 
deontological arguments for patents, although they are frequently conflated. On the one hand, one 
could appeal primarily to claims of desert. According to this line of thinking, patents are the 
deserved reward for intellectual labour; call this the desert account. Just as some people think that 
those who work harder deserve more pay, the desert account holds that patents are the deserved 
reward for invention. On the other hand, one could appeal to claims of natural rights. Patents are 
what inventors are entitled to as an extension of their natural rights; call this the entitlement 
account. On this account, in the same way that I am entitled to keep the vegetables I grow, I am also 
entitled to own the ideas that I conceive.
One reason that these distinct kinds of deontological argument have often been run together is 
because many defenders of intellectual property rights have turned to the work of John Locke.
24 
They have taken Locke (1689)'s famous account of the legitimacy of property rights in token 
property as a starting point for a defence of intellectual property rights. But Locke appeals to a 
range of different values and considerations and is actually to some extent ambiguous between 
desert-based and entitlement-based justifications of property rights. This ambiguity has often 
carried over into the work of neo-Lockean defenders of intellectual property rights. They claim on 
the one hand that patents are entitlements which derive from natural rights; but they also appeal to 
the claim that intellectual labour deserves reward, and that patents are an appropriate reward. As we 
24 See, for instance Moore [(1998),(2004)]; Spinello (2003); Himma (2008); Palmer (2005).
8shall see later, this is problematic not just because the Desert account and the Entitlement account 
are distinct, but also because they may be to some extent inconsistent.
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of arguing against the deontological approach (in both its desert 
and entitlement-based forms) is not simply to demonstrate the flaws in one line of justification for 
the patent system. I intentionally leave open the possibility of a consequentialist justification. 
Remember that the consequentialist rationale behind the patent system is not necessarily in conflict 
with the Mertonian ideal mentioned in Section 1. In which case, by showing that deontological 
concerns do not mandate patents, I will also be showing that there is no genuine conflict between 
the morally important interests of inventors, and the interests of wider society.
3. Desert
In this section I develop and assess 'desert-for-labour' justifications of the patent system. Drawing 
from literature in political philosophy on desert, I outline how the basic desert claim alluded to 
above could be elaborated. I then argue that on any plausible interpretation of the desert-for labour 
claim, patents allow owners to reap profits that exceed the reward they actually deserve. This is due 
to the fact that the marginal cost of selling an additional license to an invention is always zero, 
which breaks any proportionality relation between labour and reward (which is theoretically present 
in the sale of physical but not intellectual goods). I then argue that the patent system necessarily 
precludes the rewarding of many deserving labourers.
3.1 Developing the desert-for-labour claim
Before discussing the case for desert-based justifications of the patent system, I must elaborate on 
what such a justification would involve. As mentioned above, considerations of desert are 
sometimes appealed to or alluded to in modern Lockean defences of intellectual property. Several 
authors refer to claims of desert, arguing that intellectual property rights are the deserved reward for 
intellectual labour. For example, Moore (2003):
"Sometimes individuals who voluntarily do or fail to do certain things deserve some outcome or other. Thus, 
students may deserve high honour grades and criminals may deserve punishment... These claims and obligations 
are generated by what individuals do or fail to do... if desert can properly attach to labour or creation, then 
claims may be generated in these cases as well."(p121)
A similar appeal to the desert claim is made by Spinello (2003):
“We argue for a secure regime of protection based on the Lockean vision that property rights are justly deserved 
as a reward for labour that creates value” (p1, emphasis mine)
While the 'desert-for-labour' claim is rarely elaborated upon, the basic idea is simple. Generally, 
claims of desert are grounded in certain features of individuals, such as things that have happened to 
them or acts they have performed. These are the 'bases' of desert (Feinberg 1970). According to 
desert-for-labour arguments, labour is one such base for desert. When we labour, we generate prima 
facie moral claims to certain rewards. A desert-based defence of intellectual property, then, will 
claim that labourers who produce ideas deserve reward, and that property rights in their ideas are 
the appropriate reward for that labour. For instance, the fact that Tse Wen Chang (the inventor of 
example b)) spent his time and effort thinking about and experimenting with rice and vegetable 
juice, eventually hitting upon the idea of boiling the one with the other, constitutes a basis for 
9desert. This desert basis generates a moral claim to a certain reward, namely, a patent over the 
invention.
Strangely, while this appeal to desert appears to be a crucial step in their arguments, these writers 
rarely elaborate upon it. Instead, they go on to focus on Locke's theory of the conditions of just 
appropriation of goods, and arguing that intellectual property can meet these conditions. This 
application of Locke is an interesting line of argument and will be dealt with in the next section. 
However, it is not relevant to present purposes. What is relevant and what they fail to elaborate on 
and defend is the claim that patent rights constitute a deserved reward for intellectual labour. 
Perhaps this is because the desert-for-labour claim is not intended as a substantive premise of the 
argument. These writers may believe that Locke's conditions, if met, are sufficient to establish the 
legitimacy of intellectual property. Whether or not inventors also in some important sense deserve 
to own their inventions may not be seen as an important issue.
However, the appeal to desert does seem to be playing a role in the arguments quoted above, even 
though it is not elaborated on. If it is not intended to play an important role, then its inclusion is at 
best misleading, and at worst, adds spurious weight to the overall argument. I do not attempt to 
decide between interpretations here. Rather, I will assume for the sake of argument that an appeal to 
substantive desert is being made, and assess the potential for arguments which make such appeals. 
Even if none of the writers identified above actually intends to mount a desert-based justification, it 
nevertheless appears to be a natural and promising strategy to take, consistent with desert-based 
justification of profits more generally, which can be found elsewhere in political philosophy on 
desert.
25 Appeals to desert-for-labour arguments in the context of intellectual property have not yet 
been connected to this literature. This is surprising, given the volume of literature on the topic. It is 
also unfortunate, because it makes such appeals harder to assess, due to the fact that several 
important features of the claim of desert are left ambiguous. In what follows I will connect these 
two areas. I grant for the sake of argument that intellectual labour could generate desert claims, but 
deny that these claims are best met by granting patents. I first lay out some of the ways the desert 
claim could be interpreted, drawing from the literature. I then argue that on any plausible 
interpretation, patents are not the appropriate reward for intellectual labour. Other systems of 
reward would work better at meeting the demands of the desert claims.
First, however, I should note that no one could plausibly argue that the current patent system 
perfectly allocates rewards to all those who deserve them, in exact proportion to degrees of desert. 
For one thing the current system takes a one-size-fits-all approach with its 20 years protection 
period. If the level of reward deserved for an invention is based on the amount of labour involved, 
then clearly different lengths of patent protection would be necessary to reflect this. Despite this, it 
might be argued that the current system is the best reflection of desert that is practically possible. To 
attempt to calculate exactly the correct amount of reward deserved and adjust the length of 
protection accordingly would be impossible, so an arbitrary period of 20 years for all may be a 
reasonable compromise. While it does not deliver rewards entirely accurately according to desert, it 
may be claimed, the patent system nevertheless leads to a distribution of rewards which 
approximates what inventors deserve to the most practical degree possible. In what follows I argue 
against this claim; alternative systems would more closely approximate what inventors deserve.
Before continuing with my main objections to this claim, I should first note an important distinction 
between two kinds of desert. Olsaretti (2004) distinguishes between institutional and pre-
institutional desert. Desert is an institutional principle if its demands are wholly reducible to or 
determined by the rules and purposes of institutions within which desert claims arise. By contrast, 
25 See for instance Feinburg (1970), Miller (1976) and Sher (1987)
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example of an institutional desert claim is that 'the runner who comes first deserves the prize'. An 
example of a pre-institutional desert claim is that 'someone who has had a particularly hard life 
deserves some respite in their old age'. If the demands that the desert-claim generates are 
determined by the rules and purposes of the patent system, then the desert argument has no 
independent force.  So if the institution of patents is to be justified by appeal to desert, this desert 
must be pre-institutional or else based on other, justified institutions. For example, return to b), the 
vegetable nutrient-enriched rice invention. The claim that Chang deserves reward for his labour 
must be interpreted as a case of pre-institutional rather than institutional desert. That is, it cannot 
simply be that Chang deserves the patent because the purpose of the patent system is to reward 
inventors with patents. Rather, it must be that Chang deserves the patent independently of the patent 
institution, and the patent institution is justified because it responds to these pre-institutional claims. 
Interestingly, one of Moore's paradigm examples of desert in the quote above, that high-achieving 
students deserve high grades, appears to refer to institutional rather than pre-institutional desert. 
However, it's clear that if desert-claims are to ground a substantive argument for the patent system, 
they must be pre-institutional.
As I interpret them here, and as is standard in the literature, claims of desert involve a three-place 
relation between a deserving subject, a deserved object, and a basis for the desert. For example, take 
the claim that I deserve to be paid five pounds because I mowed your lawn. This claim involves a 
deserving subject (me), a deserved object (five pounds), and a desert basis (mowing your lawn). In 
the case of the desert-for-labour argument for patents then, we must identify the relevant subject, 
object and basis for desert. The obvious candidates would be as follows; the relevant subject is the 
inventor, the relevant object is patent protection over the invention, and the relevant desert base is 
labour.
There are different ways to elaborate on the claim that labour is the base for desert. Exactly which 
aspect of labour is generating claims of desert here? Lamont and Favor (2008) survey contemporary 
proposals and identify three possibilities.
1. Compensation: People should be rewarded according to the costs they incur in their work 
activity. (Dick 1975, Lamont 1997)
2. Effort: People should be rewarded according to the effort they expend in their work activity. 
(Sadurski 1985a,b, Milne 1986) 
3. Contribution: People should be rewarded for their work activity according to the value of 
their contribution to the social product. (Miller 1976, Miller 1989, Riley 1989)
Note that as well as being the basis for desert, these various features are also taken to determine the 
level of reward that is due. For instance, according to 1), the fact that I have incurred costs in my 
work means that I deserve a reward; i.e. cost is a base for desert. But exactly how much cost I 
incurred also determines exactly how much of a reward I deserve; i.e. cost determines the level of 
reward. So (1-3) are not just bases for desert, but also determinants of deserved reward.
In what follows I do not aim to decide between these desert bases. My strategy is instead to argue 
that on any of these interpretations, or any mixture thereof, patents are a poor method of distributing 
deserved rewards to inventors. The arguments that follow are not intended to be arguments against 
desert-based justifications of the way the market allocates profits to labourers (for such arguments 
see Olsaretti [2004]). Indeed, I'm willing to concede for the sake of argument that the market 
distributes rewards roughly according to desert. For instance, I am willing to grant that the profits a 
farmer gains from selling fruit are a decent approximation of level of reward she deserves for her 
11labour (whether measured in terms of cost, effort or contribution). My criticisms are specific to the 
way that the patent system rewards inventors. My first argument is based on the fact that unlike 
selling token physical goods, the marginal cost of selling another license to a patented invention 
type is zero. My second argument is based on the fact that unlike the creation of physical goods, 
invention is always cumulative and borrows from the ideas of the past. Each argument will take into 
account the three different possible bases for desert. When it comes to the profits that inventors gain 
from selling licenses to their patents on the free market, there are special reasons why these are 
unlikely to reflect deserved rewards. Alternative systems would better reflect deserved rewards.
3.2 Profits from patents are not proportional to deserved reward.
As explained in section 2, patents cover types rather than tokens. If I own a patent on an anti-AIDS 
drug, I do not just own particular token doses of the drug. Instead, I have the right to exclude others 
from making, using, selling and distributing any new tokens of the drug. Of course, most patent 
owners exercise this right not by actually completely excluding others, but rather by selling them a 
license to make, use, sell and/or distribute tokens of the invention. Rather than produce the drug 
themselves, the owner of an anti-AIDS drug will usually simply gain royalties from tokens of the 
drug type.
Note that because patents cover types, the cost of selling another license to your patent is zero.
26 Of 
course, the development and testing of a new invention typically does involve costs. But once the 
invention exists, it costs nothing to license it (save the administrative fees).  The owner of the anti-
AIDS drug may have spent a significant amount on the development and testing of the drug.
27 The 
cost of selling a license for the production of the first dose of the drug will equal the entire 
production cost. But once the first license has been sold, the cost of selling subsequent licenses for 
the production of the second and third doses will be nothing. In economist's terms, the 'marginal 
cost' of a license is zero. This is not the case when it comes to the profits that can be derived from 
selling token property or other kinds of labour. The marginal cost of selling token property is never 
zero (even if the marginal cost often declines somewhat due to economies of scale). If a farmer sells 
apples, she will always need to plant, pick and package each apple she sells. The marginal cost of 
selling another hour of one's labour is never zero. If a teacher is to get rewarded for her intellectual 
labour, she must continue to put in the hours at school to obtain her monthly wage.
This fact has important implications for desert-for-labour justifications of patents. The desert-based 
justification for token property works because there is a link between the degree to which the 
relevant desert basis is present and the level of reward received. In order to gain a profit from the 
sale of a token good, one must exert some effort, incur some cost, and/or make some contribution to 
the social product. Not so for intellectual goods. The fact that the marginal cost of selling a license 
is zero breaks the link between the reward received and the reward deserved. 
This is most clearly the case for cost-based desert claims. The marginal cost of selling a license to a 
token is always going to be zero, while the marginal cost of creating another token will be more 
than zero. There will always be costs involved in producing another token pill, but the owner of a 
patent on that pill incurs virtually no cost in collecting her royalty on that pill. Similar remarks 
apply to selling one's intellectual labour. Every month a teacher must spend her weekdays in the 
classroom to earn her wage. But a teacher who owns a patent on a teaching method can collect 
26 Or, at least, near enough zero. There may be some small transaction costs involved in the collection of royalties
27 DiMasi et al (2003) estimate that new drugs cost on average $800 million to bring to market, while critic Angell 
(2004) puts the figure at just $100m.
12royalties without lifting a finger.
28 This dynamic also applies if we take effort as the basis for desert 
claims. Unlike in the case of the sale of regular property or labour, the sale of a license to a token of 
an invention involves next to no effort. While the farmer toils to sell another apple, the owners of 
the Silken apple tree patent can sit back and collect royalties from the licensing of their invention. 
In the case of token property, there is a certain amount of effort behind every sale. In the case of 
intellectual property, there is none or next to none.
I must here make an important qualification. Of course, I am not claiming that the development of 
new ideas costs nothing, or that it takes no effort. Of course, all good ideas initially take effort and 
money to produce. And indeed, proponents of patents, for instance in the pharmaceutical industry, 
note that the profits they gain from patents allow them to recoup this cost and effort.
29 I do not 
dispute this. My claim is instead that the correlation between the level of reward gained from 
patents and the level of reward that is actually deserved will be weak. In the sale of token property, 
such as apples, or in wage-labour, such as apple-picking or teaching, the revenue from the sale of 
the good or the labour will always bear some correlation to the amount of cost or effort involved 
(even if market forces do not ensure perfect proportionality in this regard). But in the case of 
patents, this correlation is absent. 
Because a patent owner can always sell another license for the use of her invention, without having 
to exert further effort or incur further costs, they have the potential to gain more than their level of 
deserved reward. Note also that patents have the potential to give their owners less than their 
deserved reward.
30 Just because an inventor has put in lots of effort and incurred high costs, there is 
no guarantee that anyone will buy enough tokens of her invention for her to recoup that cost via 
licensing. In such cases inventors can get much less than they deserve. This danger is typically less 
prevalent in the sale of token goods, where the initial outlay is typically smaller and supply can be 
more easily calibrated to meet demand. Similarly, because wage-labourers get paid for the days they 
work, no more and no less, they are typically rewarded according to some fixed function of their 
labour. So in the case of token rather than type goods, there is less of a danger of labourers not 
getting their deserved return for efforts or costs incurred.
Having outlined the marginal cost problem for effort and cost-based desert claims, I now turn to 
contribution-based desert claims. They claim the level of reward deserved depends on the degree to 
which the labour is a valuable contribution to the social product. It is not so clear here that there will 
be a poor correlation between deserved rewards and actual rewards derived from patents. This is 
because, one might think, there is a correlation between how socially valuable an invention is, and 
the profits gained from licensing it. In other words, if the royalties from the anti-AIDS drug patent 
are higher than those from the Silken apple tree patent, this may be an indication that the former is 
more socially valuable than the latter. The total number of token anti-AIDS drug sold over the 
lifetime of the patent is a reflection of the social value of the invention; the profit derived from 
royalties on these tokens is therefore approximately equivalent to deserved reward.
My objection to this line of argument is that the patent system actually punishes rather than rewards 
optimal social contribution. To see why, note that there is a difference between the actual and 
potential social value of an invention. The potential social value of, say, an invented anti-AIDS drug 
is the value of all the lives it could save. The actual social value of the drug is the value of all the 
lives it actually does save. Because patent owners rely on charging for access to their inventions in 
28 Such patents do exist; see  Greenbowe et al (1998) Patent # 5813865 “Methods and apparatus for teaching science 
and engineering”
29 See 26 ^ibid 
30 And as we shall see in 3.4, the patent system also leaves some deserving labours with no reward at all.
13order to obtain their rewards, they must exclude some people who would benefit but cannot or will 
not pay.
31 This means that when inventions are patented they realise less than their potential social 
value. If, on the other hand, it is not patented but freely distributed, it can realise its full potential 
value. For example, if an anti-AIDS drug is patented, those who need it but cannot afford it will not 
get it. But if it is freely distributed, everyone who needs it can have it; the potential social value can 
be realised. 
My objection, then, is as follows. Inventors should be rewarded, rather than punished, for securing 
the full potential social value of their invention. The patent system punishes those who allow the 
social value of their invention to be fully realised, because by allowing free use of their idea 
inventors prevent themselves from getting a reward from royalties. The patent system perversely 
rewards inventors who limit the social value of their invention by excluding those who cannot or 
will not pay. This seems in direct contradiction with the spirit of the contribution-based conception 
of desert. If labourers should be rewarded according to their contribution to the social product, then 
surely those who ensure that their goods contribute more to the social product ought to be rewarded 
more, not less. Alternative systems in which inventors would be rewarded according their 
contribution to the social product would be better. Unlike the patent system, such alternatives would 
reward inventors for fully realising the potential social value of their invention, not punish them.
3.3 Unrewarded labour.
The last section explored the ways in which patents can over or under-reward inventors. This 
section expands on the latter case, arguing that a great number of deserving labourers go 
unrewarded under a patent system.
According to any of the three plausible grounds for desert, the current patent system fails to reward 
the majority of intellectual labour. This is because most intellectual labour does not result in 
intellectual goods which pass the conditions of patentability. A great number of people engage in 
some kind of intellectual labour which involves effort, cost, and / or contributes in some way to 
social product. But the vast majority of this work clearly does not get rewarded with intellectual 
property rights in the ideas generated therein. The existence of stringent criteria for patentability 
prevents this. Most ideas, even if they involve effort, cost, and / or contribution to the social 
product, would not be granted with patent rights because they do not meet the all of the conditions 
(non-obvious, useful, novel, etc.). Even if an idea is obvious, it may also be highly valuable to the 
social product; for instance, the idea of cutting down on our carbon emissions to reduce global 
warming. Discoveries about laws of nature are not patentable, because they are not genuine 
inventions; but they clearly require a lot of effort. An idea might not be novel, but that doesn't mean 
it doesn't cost anything to produce. In each case, the relevant desert base is present, but patents 
cannot be granted.
From the perspective of the desert-for-labour argument, this appears to be an injustice. If patents are 
the appropriate reward for intellectual labour, then all labourers who possess the relevant desert 
basis should be given exclusive rights over their ideas, whether or not they meet the conditions on 
patentability. A defender of the desert account might here argue that the conditions on patentability 
roughly map on to the relevant desert base, such that labourers generally deserve a reward only 
when they create something patentable. In other words, perhaps the conditions on patentability 
(non-obviousness, novelty, usefulness, invention rather than discovery) are features of all and only 
inventions for which inventors deserve reward. Even if such a conception of desert can be 
31 This is because patent owners face differential pricing problems. For instance, if a pharmaceutical company licenses 
a patented drug to one party at $1, it is difficult to license it to another at $2. See Damstedt (2003).
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one of the plausible desert bases we take - effort, cost, or contribution – they each appear capable of 
grounding desert claims in cases where the relevant invention would not meet the conditions on 
patentability. In such cases, the patent system fails to reward deserving labourers.
In order to reward these deserving labourers, defenders of the desert account might propose 
neglecting the conditions on patentability. But these conditions are in place for good practical 
reasons. Granting patent rights over the fruits of all intellectual labour, regardless of whether it 
meets the conditions, would be impractical if not impossible. We would end up in a situation where 
the use of any given item of practical knowledge would be subject to the permission of its owner. 
For instance, if we relaxed the obviousness condition, obvious solutions to practical problems could 
become patented. Relaxing the novelty condition would mean that multiple independent inventors 
would also have to be granted patent rights over the same invention. If we both independently come 
up with a new method for sorting fruit-flies, we would both have to be granted patent rights over 
this invention. This would increase the number of people whose permission a user would need to 
seek before making use of the owned invention, exacerbating the problem. Patents would also then 
no longer be exclusive, making them meaningless, and a rather poor form of reward. For example, 
if I own exclusive patent rights over a method for sorting fruit-flies, I can gain royalties from those 
who use the method. But if anyone who thinks of this method is also granted patent rights over it, 
this threatens my ability to get my reward.
So defenders of the Desert account must concede that any practical version of the patent system 
must necessarily prevent many inventors from getting what they deserve. This is not a knock-down 
objection however. It might be claimed that despite failing to reward some intellectual labour, the 
patent system, or something like it, is nevertheless the best compromise. It affords the highest 
possible number of deserving labourers with the reward they deserve. It might also be claimed that 
the patentability conditions are in place to help ensure that this optimal compromise is secured. To 
see why even this response fails to justify the patent system, we must consider how alternative 
systems can lead to a better distribution of rewards according to desert.
As mentioned above, existing alternative systems such as rewards, prizes, and / or government 
support of research, could be extended as an alternative way to reward intellectual labour. This 
could be done according to whatever metric is favoured as a desert basis (i.e. effort, cost, or 
contribution). If we take costs incurred as the basis for desert, then a reward system based on an 
inventor's estimated costs could be put in place. For example, the inventors of the anti-AIDS drug 
could be compensated according the research and development costs. Effort is difficult to precisely 
measure, but the amount of time spent inventing may be a reasonable indicator of the effort an 
inventor expends. As such, a wage paid for time spent inventing may be an appropriate reward for 
effort. For example, MIT's synthetic biology researchers get paid a yearly wage, and this may be in 
rough proportion to the amount of effort they put in. Finally, consider contribution to social product 
as a desert basis. This may be the hardest to measure, partly because it is so hard to define. 
However, a variety of metrics already exist which could be used to measure contribution to the 
social product. Governments and third sector organisations use such metrics on a daily basis to 
measure the impact of different programmes and inform their decisions. 'Social Impact 
Assessments' (SIA's) are used to inform public policy decisions and international development 
projects.
32 Even if they are imperfect, they presumably do bear some correlation to the actual value 
they attempt to measure. They could be used to measure the contribution of an individual's labour to 
the social product, and used as a basis for the distribution of rewards to inventors.
33
32 See Barrow (2000).
33 See for instance Pogge (2002)'s idea for a “Health Impact Fund”.
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proportion to desert. However, I do argue that alternative systems would be more effective than the 
patent system in this regard. Under an alternative system, where the reward for intellectual labour is 
a prize rather than a right to exclude others from the fruits of one's labour, there would be no reason 
why rewards could not be granted to deserving labourers whose intellectual goods do not meet the 
conditions of patentability. As well as rewarding those inventors who would otherwise go 
unrewarded under a patent system, these alternative systems would not over or under-reward 
inventors in the way that the patent system does (as explained in 3.3 above).
In this section, I have argued against a desert-based justification of the patent system. Drawing from 
literature in political philosophy on desert, I have outlined how the basic desert claim alluded to in 
the arguments of Moore and others could be elaborated (3.1). I then argued that on any plausible 
interpretation of the desert-for labour claim, patents allow owners to reap profits that exceed the 
reward they actually deserve (3.2). This is due to the fact that the marginal cost of selling a license 
to an invention is always zero. This breaks the proportionality between labour and reward (which is 
generally present in the sale of token goods). I then argued that the patent system necessarily 
precludes the rewarding of many deserving labourers, while alternative systems do not (3.3). In 
conclusion, on any plausible account of desert, appeals to desert do not support the patent system. 
Alternative systems would be better at distributing rewards to inventors on a desert-for-labour basis.
4. Entitlement
In this section I argue against an Entitlement-based justification of the patent system. According to 
this approach, patents are grounded in certain natural rights that people have. I first introduce the 
basic idea, outlining Locke's 'provisos' – conditions under which it is legitimate to claim ownership 
rights over a good. I then reproduce a popular argument according to which the claiming of 
property rights in intellectual goods, unlike for token goods, always trivially satisfies the provisos. 
After a discussion of the metaphysics of invention, and of the nature of the commons, I will argue 
that Locke's conditions are not trivially satisfied in the case of patents. I then argue that they are 
also problematic because they fail to take into account pre-existing property rights. Entitlement-
based arguments infer that because new inventions are unowned, claiming property rights in them 
involves only the same moral considerations that would apply in the state of nature. But, I argue, 
because we are not in the state of nature, we must also consider pre-existing property rights, which 
conflict with patents. This ultimately undermines an entitlement-based justification of patents. 
Combined with the arguments of the last section, this will show that the only tenable approach to 
defending the patent system is a consequentialist one.
4.1. Introducing the Entitlement account and its application to intellectual goods
As mentioned in the introduction, while neo-Lockean defenders of patents sometimes appear to be 
appealing to the kind of desert-for-labour argument discussed in section 3, they do not elaborate on 
such appeals. Rather, they turn to a certain strand of Locke's thinking. This approach is taken by 
Moore [(1998), (2003)] who states that his arguments are a development of Nozick (1976). Locke 
was concerned with the question of how property rights in token goods could be originally justified. 
If you legitimately own some property, then sell it to me, then under normal conditions I 
legitimately own that property. But how did anyone come to legitimately own property in the first 
place? To answer this question, Locke imagined a 'state of nature', a period prior to civilisation, in 
16which nobody owned anything other than their own bodies and minds. How, in such a situation, did 
anybody come to own anything? According to Locke, ownership of one's own body and mind 
extends to ownership of the products of one's body and mind. In this way, then, individuals in the 
state of nature can come to own the things they create. 
But creating things with ones labour inevitably involves taking resources. I cannot build a shelter 
without claiming some land and cutting down a tree, nor make a meal without taking some berries 
or killing an animal. According to Locke, all of the unowned resources in the state of nature form 
part of a 'commons'. He proposed that the taking of resources from the commons is only legitimate 
if two provisos are met. One must a) leave 'enough and as good' for others, and b) not waste the 
property one appropriates. If these conditions are met, then one can claim property rights in what 
one creates with the resources of the commons. Of course, state of nature theorising about the 
conditions under which it is legitimate to appropriate unowned resources is not relevant to the 
majority of property claims today. Most valuable physical matter on earth is now owned, and if I 
want a house, or to eat a meal, I purchase them. I don't go looking for unowned land or hunting 
wildlife. Locke was concerned with how our system of property rights could ever have legitimately 
got started in the first place. The provisos are therefore less relevant to the question of how property 
can be legitimately acquired now. In most cases, property is now acquired through exchanging 
goods on a marketplace, rather than taking something unowned from the commons.
Except, perhaps, in the case of intellectual property, whose defenders have frequently turned to 
Locke. The question seems to be the same as that which Locke grappled with in imagining the state 
of nature. How could it be that inventors come to legitimately have property rights over inventions 
that they previously did not own? It is as if we are permanently in state of nature when it comes to 
new ideas. This is the reason that entitlement-based defenders of intellectual property resurrect the 
Lockean provisos.
34 If they can show that Locke's conditions of just appropriation can be met in the 
case of intellectual property, then patents may be justified in just the same way that token property 
is justified. They argue that intellectual property not only can meet the provisos, but that there are 
good reasons to think that it always does meet them. For this reason, intellectual property is on 
especially strong justificatory grounds. In what follows I outline these arguments, taking each 
proviso in turn.
Take the 'enough and as good' proviso. In the case of token property, one can fail to satisfy this 
condition by taking so much from the commons that other people will not have enough. But in the 
case of intellectual property, can one ever fail to satisfy this condition? One reason we might think 
one cannot is that in inventing a new idea, one does not need to appropriate anything from the 
unowned commons. This is unlike the creation of a new physical good, which would require taking 
physical materials from the commons. So because the creation of intellectual goods does not require 
taking anything from the commons, there can be no equivalent problem. Two important 
clarifications of this point are worth bearing in mind. 
First, it is true that to come up with a new idea one inevitably must draw on already known ideas 
and use them as inspiration. We can conceptualise the domain of already known (and unpatented) 
ideas as a kind of 'information commons' (Himma 2007). But ideas, unlike the physical goods of the 
commons, are non-rival in consumption. The information commons can be drawn from without 
depriving anyone else of the ability to use the ideas contained within it to come up with their own 
inventions. When Tse Wen Chang invented his method for enriching rice with fruit and vegetable 
nutrients, he did not need to appropriate the idea of boiling rice, or of juicing vegetables. He freely 
used these ideas, but without taking them from the intellectual commons of which they are part. The 
34 See 26 ^ibid 
17'ingredients' that must be appropriated to produce physical goods tend to be rival, but the equivalent 
ingredients of new ideas are not rival, and hence no problem of appropriation exists.
Second, this point does not imply that invention involves no physical materials. The resources used 
to create intellectual property are not solely intellectual. When Tse Wen Chang invented the method 
for enriching rice with fruit and vegetable nutrients, he did not only draw on ideas such as boiling 
rice and juicing vegetables. He also used up tangible physical resources – experimenting with actual 
rice and vegetables, water, cooking equipment. Just as with the creation of physical goods, the 
creation of intellectual goods also requires physical resources. But this does not affect the argument 
if we assume that these physical resources used were legitimately owned by the inventor. If Chang 
had taken the physical resources (rice, cooking equipment) from the commons, without leaving 
enough for others, then there would be a problem.
The conclusion drawn is that in inventing intellectual goods, one need not claim the exclusive use 
of any resources from the commons. One can use physical resources (which one already owns), and 
ideas from the intellectual commons (which one does not need to appropriate in order to use), in 
order to come up with a new invention. In which case, the first proviso will be trivially fulfilled; 
nothing will have been taken from the commons. The question of leaving enough and as good is 
therefore irrelevant.
Locke's second proviso, according to which property rights are only legitimate if the owner does not 
let the good go to waste, also seems to be trivially fulfilled in the case of intellectual property. With 
token property like land, it's clear that it will go to waste - become dry, or overrun with weeds, or 
unproductive due to overuse - unless I maintain it carefully. But ideas cannot get overused in the 
way that farmland can. They do not require maintaining. The wheel is as good an idea now as it 
ever was, and nobody had to maintain it or limit its use for the idea to remain useful. So, a defender 
of patents might argue, it looks like the non-waste proviso is also trivially fulfilled in the case of 
intellectual property.
4.2 'Enough and as good'; two models of invention
However, I think the basic intuitions behind both the provisos actually do apply to the claiming of 
patent rights, in a somewhat modified form. In this section I deal with the first proviso which 
stipulates that 'enough and as good' of the resources used must be left for others. This proviso is a 
recognition that everybody has a an equal right to a share of an unowned resource. It prohibits the 
taking of unowned goods where this would deprive others of their share of such goods. This is what 
makes it relevant to intellectual property. To explain this further, I must first make a distinction 
between two ways to conceive of the metaphysics of invention, and some practical realities about 
the use of new ideas.
There are, I believe, two different possible models of the metaphysics of invention. They are not 
distinguished in the literature, but they have implications for the validity of the arguments put 
forward. They are:
Genesis:
There are old ideas, which are held in common. Intellectual labour involves using these old 
ideas as intellectual resources (in addition to physical resources) to come up with entirely new 
ideas. For example, Chang used the idea of juicing vegetables, and the idea of boiling rice, 
etc, as intellectual resources (in addition to some physical resources, such as actual rice, 
18vegetables, and cooking equipment) to come up with an entirely new idea for a method to 
enrich rice with vegetable nutrients.
Platonic Discovery:
There are ideas, some of which are known, the rest of which are (as yet) unknown. Intellectual 
labour involves using the known ideas as intellectual resources (in addition to physical 
resources) to arrive at previously unknown ideas. For example, before Chang came along, the 
idea of boiling rice with vegetable juice to increase its nutritional value was an unknown idea. 
But when Chang used certain intellectual resources (the idea of juicing vegetables; the idea of 
boiling rice; etc.), as well as some physical resources, he arrived at the previously unknown 
idea.
According to the Genesis model, Locke's first proviso seems irrelevant to the appropriation of 
intellectual property. It is trivially met in every case because no resources from the commons are 
used up in the process of invention. The resources used are non-rival; their use does not involve a 
loss to the commons. The question of whether intellectual labourers are taking more than their fair 
share is irrelevant; they are not really 'taking' anything, because everything they used is still 
available for everyone else to use. What they do is create an entirely new intellectual good. Their 
appropriation of this good is not akin to taking something from the commons because the new 
invention was never part of the commons to begin with. So the first proviso is trivially fulfilled 
because no appropriation from the commons has taken place.
According to the Platonic Discovery model, it is not so obvious whether the first Lockean proviso 
will always be trivially met. Unowned ideas belong to no one, and thus are part of the commons, in 
the same way that unowned land is part of the commons. Because all unknown ideas are unowned, 
they are part of the commons. In which case, if an inventor appropriates a previously unknown idea 
that she has arrived at through intellectual labour, she is taking something away from the commons. 
In which case, we must check that the first Lockean proviso is met. If the inventor appropriates the 
idea, will there be enough and as good other ideas left for everyone else to appropriate? Possibly 
not. Thus the argument made by Himma above may not work if we are assuming a Platonic 
Discovery rather than Genesis model of invention. However, Rosenberg (2004) presents a different 
argument to the effect that appropriation of intellectual goods trivially fulfils the first Lockean 
proviso, and his argument explicitly appeals to a platonic discovery model of invention. Rosenburg 
claims that unlike the earth's scarce physical resources, there are countless unknown ideas out there 
waiting to be found. If I discover and appropriate one of them, there are still enough others out there 
for everyone else to discover and appropriate. Thus the Lockean proviso will always be 
unproblematically fulfilled for intellectual property. Even if appropriation of new ideas does deplete 
the commons, the commons of ideas is so large that no matter how much one person appropriates, 
there will always be enough and as good for everyone else.
35
So the claim that intellectual property rights automatically meet the Lockean provisos will need to 
be defended in different ways depending on which model of invention is assumed. Rather than 
attempt to decide between these two models, I shall argue that on either model the relevant 
argument is not sound. Consider first the argument which assumes the Genesis model. According to 
this argument, because claiming property rights in a new idea does not deplete the commons, such 
35 Interestingly, note that this model collapses the invention / discovery distinction, just as Plato's account of 
knowledge collapses the learning / remembering distinction (Meno, 86b). On this model, all so-called invention of 
new ideas is actually discovery of previously unknown ones. This would make the invention / discovery distinction 
upheld in patent law appear unprincipled, and might therefore ground a rejection of that principle. I leave this issue 
to one side for now.
19claims always trivially meet the proviso.
It is in one sense true that the appropriation of a new idea does not deplete the commons, because 
the idea appropriated was never itself part of the commons. And it is also true that even if old ideas 
from the commons were drawn upon in coming up with the new idea, these old ideas are strictly 
speaking still part of the commons. But there is a sense in which the commons has been depleted. 
Prior to the appropriation, individuals other than the actual inventor were free to use the old ideas to 
come up with the new idea, i.e. to invent it themselves. For example, prior to Juizup Corporation's 
appropriation of the nutrient-enriched-rice process, individuals were free to draw on the ideas of 
boiling rice and juicing vegetables, and to combine these ideas to create nutrient-enriched rice. After 
the patent is granted, individuals lose the opportunity to do this freely; they now must attempt to 
negotiate with the patent owner. The opportunity to use certain ideas from the commons in certain 
ways has been lost. 
When a patent is granted on an invention which draws from the commons, the value of the 
commons is diminished. Even if the number of ideas in the commons remains the same, the value of 
the commons with respect to non-owners decreases. Non-owners are no longer able to freely use 
them in the ways they were before. Even if I was not ever actually going to combine the ideas of 
juicing vegetables and boiling rice, the patenting of Chang's invention still reduces the value of 
those ideas for me, because I am no longer free to use them in that way. In which case, the first 
Lockean proviso is not always trivially fulfilled. We must ask, in each case of appropriation, 
whether there is still enough and as good left in the commons for others. And if the opportunities to 
use ideas from the commons in certain ways are reduced, this may constitute a failure to leave 
enough and as good for others.
Next, consider Rosenburg's argument which assumes the Platonic Discovey model of invention. To 
see what is wrong with this argument, note that the proviso does not merely state that one must 
leave enough but also as good. If I appropriate more than my share of the land, I could not justify 
this on the grounds that there are plenty of other resources for you to appropriate under the earth's 
surface, or on the moon. And not all land is equally fertile. The portion of the commons which I 
must leave for others must be of some practical use to them. It must be 'as good' as that which I 
have taken.
It may be true that there is a near-unlimited supply of ideas out there waiting to be discovered. But 
the number of ideas that can be put to good use at any given time is constrained by several factors. 
There are only so many human wants and needs, so that demand for new ideas is limited. There are 
only so many people with so much time and money to spend on new inventions. Only so many 
ideas are relevant and useful at a particular time and at a particular stage of scientific and 
technological progress. Technologies are usually only valuable for a short period of time. Particular 
industries have standard techniques, parts, and ways of doing things, and functionally equivalent 
alternatives are just not as valuable once an industry standard is in place. The idea of an electron 
microscope may be highly useful at one stage of scientific progress, but less so later. Because of 
these constraints, only so many ideas are actually valuable at a given time. Even if there is a near 
limitless stock of ideas to be discovered, there will always be a limit to the number of those new 
ideas which are actually useful and valuable at the time.
Locke's paradigm case of appropriation of the commons was the vast and (in Locke's eyes) 
'unowned' commons of America. There is no modern equivalent in land; almost everywhere is now 
owned by someone. But one might say that the domain of as yet unknown or un-invented ideas is 
like Locke's America. One might even draw a parallel between the appropriation of ideas and the 
20enclosure of common land (Boyle 2004). Given this, the appropriation of ideas, like the 
appropriation of land, is actually problematic and subject to the first proviso. Those who appropriate 
good, useful and timely new ideas may in fact deprive others of their share of such ideas. As well as 
offending the Mertonian ideal of universal access to the fruits of science, patents may also fail to 
meet Locke's first proviso on legitimate appropriation.
4.3 Waste
As for the second proviso - one must not waste what one appropriates - a version of it may also 
apply in the case of ideas. Of course, ideas cannot rot or whither due to over-use. So there is no 
problem of literal spoilage. But the basic rationale behind the second proviso does apply to ideas. 
The idea is that one can only take something from the commons if one puts it to good use. When 
one has taken some resource from the commons (thus depriving others of it), one is under a duty to 
use the resource. Failure to do so constitutes waste. 
It is not only physical resources that can be wasted in this way. Imagine a scientist who discovers a 
cure for cancer, obtains a patent, and then refuses to sell the cure. This is the equivalent scenario to 
a case where I appropriate some land and let it go dry or get overrun with weeds. The resource 
appropriated from the commons has been wasted; it would have been better in the hands of 
someone else who would have put it to some use.
Many less extreme cases of wastage of an appropriated idea can be found. Large players in an 
industry will file for patents that they never intend to use. This is so that they can prevent others 
from entering the market. Cases of so-called 'patent trolls' also abound. Patent trolls file patents not 
in order to manufacture inventions, or sell the patents to manufacturers, but for the explicit purpose 
of extracting damages from those who unwittingly infringe on the patent. Both of these cases 
involve appropriating an idea and excluding everyone from its use; a clear example of wastage.
Even if it seems clear that in these cases patent owners are guilty of wastage, it is unclear exactly 
how we should assess whether some appropriated idea has been wasted. Waste cannot simply be 
sub-optimal use of the idea. This would be too demanding, as any situation in which less than the 
total number of people who want to use the idea get to use it, would count as waste. This would 
effectively prevent the inventor from making any profit as she would have to license it to anyone 
who had the slightest desire for it, even if they did not want to pay. On the other hand, as the 
examples above show, patent holders would intuitively be wasting their idea if they simply 
excluded everyone. Perhaps the definition of waste is set by reference to the minimum use that any 
decent person would make of their property. An exact characterisation of the boundary between 
waste and merely sub-optimal use would require more sustained analysis than I can attempt here.
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In any case, there is no good reason why the waste proviso should not apply to the appropriation of 
physical and intellectual goods alike. Thus, patents do not trivially satisfy the waste proviso.
4.4. State of nature, and the violation of pre-existing rights.
I have argued against the popular claim that the Lockean provisos are always trivially met in the 
case of intellectual property. However, it would still be possible for a defender of the Entitlement 
account to claim that in the vast majority of cases, the provisos are substantively met. In which case, 
while on less strong ground than they initially appeared, patents would still be justified in most 
36 For discussion of the waste proviso in relation to intellectual property, see Hull (2009)
21cases on entitlement-based grounds. In this section I want to show why even this claim is 
problematic. The problem comes from the fact that these writers mistakenly apply state-of-nature 
theorising to a civilised context. They assume that because new inventions are unowned, claiming 
property rights in them involves only the same moral considerations that would apply in the state of 
nature. But, I argue, because we are not in the state of nature, we must also consider pre-existing 
property rights, which conflict with patents. This ultimately undermines an entitlement-based 
justification of patents.
Recall that Locke's purpose is to show how, in the state of nature, unowned resources can become 
legitimately owned. Because they deal with the just appropriation of unowned resources, and new 
ideas are unowned, it is understandable that neo-Lockeans turn to the provisos when attempting to 
justify patents. But the state of nature is clearly very different to a state of civilisation. Even if the 
Lockean provisos constitute a correct account of the legitimate appropriation of unowned goods in 
the state of nature, they might not be a correct account of the appropriation of unowned goods in a 
modern context. In the state of nature, most physical stuff is not owned, as nobody has many 
property rights. But in the real world, almost all physical stuff is owned by someone. There are 
many pre-existing property rights. The appropriation of an idea will have different consequences 
depending on whether it is appropriated in the state of nature, or in a civilised context.
Imagine a savage in the state of nature who, unlike his peers, boils rice and juices vegetables. One 
day he invents a method for cooking a nutritious meal, by boiling rice in vegetable juice. A 
particularly advanced savage, he decides that he will claim this method as his property, such that 
others must ask his permission if they want to use this method. In a state of nature, the appropriation 
of a method for cooking a nutritious meal would not conflict with anybody's pre-existing property 
rights, because (we can assume) nobody owns any rice, vegetables or relevant cooking equipment. 
If the provisos are also met (i.e. claiming property rights in this method leaves enough and as good, 
and does not get wasted), then according to the entitlement account, claiming the method as his 
property would be legitimate.
37 This is not the case in the modern day. When Juizup gained 
ownership over the method of boiling rice with vegetable juice, many people around the world lost 
one of their freedoms. Prior to the granting of the patent, anybody who owned rice, vegetables and 
relevant cooking equipment were free to combine them to make vegetable-nutrient enriched rice for 
personal or commercial use; afterwards, this was not the case.
The same applies for other examples. Before the Silken apple tree patent was granted, anybody who 
owned a Honeygold and a Sunrise tree was free to cross those trees in such a way as to create a 
hybrid Silken tree. Prior to the patent on the synthetic biology vectors, researchers were free to 
combine cells into the compositions covered by the patent. Until the anti-AIDS drug was patented, 
developers were free to select the combination of ingredients mentioned in the patent and create a 
drug out of them. 
Neo-Lockean defenders of patents have been misled by the fact that new ideas are unowned into 
thinking that the Lockean provisos exhaust the conditions under which property rights in unowned 
objects can be legitimately claimed. But given that we are not in the state of nature, we should not 
focus solely on the provisos. We must also consider pre-existing property rights. Even if the 
provisos can be substantively met in the case of intellectual property, there is a further problem with 
the granting of patents; they take no account of pre-existing property rights. Property rights in ideas 
inevitably violate these pre-existing rights in the ways outlined in the examples above. Lockean 
'state-of-nature' style theorising blinds defenders of the entitlement account to the existence of this 
rights violation.
37 Of course, with no state-enforced patent system, this right may not be respected; but it would still be legitimate.
22How should this be resolved? Entitlement-based defenders of patents might claim that even if 
patents create conflicts with pre-existing rights over token property, it's not clear why the patent 
owner should always lose out. Shouldn't we first weigh up the interests of both the patent owner and 
the owners of the token property affected by the patent, and decide on that basis which should 
prevail? Making such comparisons already gives up too much the patent owner. In cases where two 
existing rights conflict, it may be appropriate to consider which rights-holder's interests have greater 
moral weight than the other. But we are not here considering a case of two conflicting rights. 
Rather, we are considering a conflict between the pre-existing property rights of one party (the 
token property owners), and the interests of the would-be patent owner. In such cases, according to 
the entitlement account, it is pre-existing rights which must prevail. For imagine a similar case in 
which I come across your land, mistakenly believing that it is unowned. I begin to farm it, and 
claim that I am thereby entitled to property rights in the land. According to the Lockean account, I 
am mistaken; I cannot claim property rights in the land because that would violate your pre-existing 
property rights. In the same way, claiming property rights in ideas would violate the pre-existing 
rights of the owners of token property. It is these pre-existing property rights which should prevail 
against any interests an inventor may have in claiming property rights in her idea.
5. Conclusion
To summarise the arguments so far: Patents restrict access to the fruits of scientific and 
technological progress . They therefore appear to conflict with the laudable Mertonian ideal of 
universal access to these fruits, and stand in need of justification (section 1). A number of 
philosophers have responded to this challenge, proposing both consequentialist and deontological 
justifications (2); this dissertation has focused on the latter. I distinguished between desert and 
entitlement based deontological arguments, which are often conflated.
38 
I argued that even if we grant the premises of desert-based arguments, they still do not give us 
reason to choose the patent system over alternative systems (3). Because patents cover tokens and 
not types, the profits one can gain from licensing them do not correlate to the level of reward 
actually 'deserved', and they actually punish rather than reward maximal contribution to the social 
product (3.2). They also fail to reward many 'deserving' labourers (3.3). Alternative systems would 
be better at distributing the deserved level of reward to a greater number of deserving labourers.
In (4) I considered entitlement-based accounts, which appeal to Locke's theory of the just 
acquisition of goods in the state of nature (4.1). I argued that this move is problematic. Locke's 
provisos are not always satisfied in the case of intellectual property, as Rosenburg and others claim. 
Claiming property rights in ideas potentially does involve a loss to the commons, whether we 
conceive of the metaphysics of invention in terms of Genesis or Platonic Discovery, and as such, 
the 'enough and as good' proviso does apply (4.2). When ideas are owned, they can be wasted (4.3), 
thus invoking the wastage proviso. Furthermore, exclusively appealing to the provisos is 
problematic. While they may be appropriate for state-of-nature theorising, we are not in the state of 
nature. New inventions are born into a world where the physical goods they relate to are already 
owned. As such, they will inevitably conflict with pre-existing property rights (4.4).
Sections 3 and 4 together show that there are significant problems for the deontological approach in 
38 We can now note that they are not only distinct accounts, but may also not be mutually supportive; one might be 
entitled to patent  rights without deserving them, and vice-versa. See Feinberg (1970, p86), for the conflict between 
desert and entitlement.
23both its guises. As previously mentioned, this conclusion leaves open the possibility of a 
consequentialist justification of the patent system, that is, by reference to the system's overall effect 
on innovation, social benefit or some other plausible end. This would require strong empirical 
evidence, which philosophical analysis alone cannot provide.
But note that even if such a consequentialist argument were successful, it would not necessarily 
present the same kind of rights-based conflict with the Mertonian ideal of sharing the fruits of 
scientific labour. Empirical research might reveal that the implementation of a patent system is the 
most efficient way to maximise and fairly distribute these fruits. Either way, the arguments 
presented here against the deontological approach allow us to reach an important conclusion. 
Debates about intellectual property rights frequently imply that the rights of creators are always 
necessarily pitted against the interests of wider society. But if there are no sound deontological 
arguments for patents, then there is no fundamental, rights-based conflict between the interests of 
inventors and the realisation of the Mertonian ideal. The justification of the patent system rests 
instead on advancing a plausible analysis of its likely consequences – the burden of proof for which 
rests with the system's proponents.
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